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Outsourcing and Insourcing of Organizational Activities: The Role of Outsourcing Process 
Mechanisms 
 
Abstract 
The decision to outsource organizational activities is studied widely, but research on the 
aftermath of outsourcing decisions and the insourcing of outsourced activities is scarce. We 
study outsourcing decision as a process not an event, and investigate the influences of 
organizational mechanisms on its sustainability. We argue that organizational learning from the 
outsourcing decision process could over time result in competencies that would enhance the 
sustainability of outsourcing decisions. We examine outsourcing and insourcing processes 
longitudinally among 64 public services in 1,650 local governments across 25 years. The results 
from regression analysis generally support our theory that the outsourcing process mechanisms, 
especially the mechanisms associated with implementing the outsourcing decision, predict the 
occurrence of insourcing. We discuss the implications of our organizational behavioural study of 
outsourcing decisions for future research on outsourcing and insourcing of public services.  
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Government outsourcing of organizational activities is a longstanding practice. Outsourcing 
gained momentum with waves of management reform and promises of better decision-making 
and more efficient and responsive public services (Boyne 1998; Hood 1991; Savas 1987). 
Scholars have probed decisions to outsource organizational functions, operations, and services 
(Globerman and Vining 1996; Brudney et al. 2004) while others have questioned its wisdom and 
effectiveness (Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2013; Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002; Sclar 
2000). Academic studies have been grounded primarily on the logic of organization economics 
and political science such as transaction cost economics (TCE), agency theory, and public choice 
theory (PCT) (Hodge 2000; Boyne et al. 2003; Brown, and Potoski, 2003b). Empirical studies 
have focused mainly on outsourcing as a transaction, measured it as a dichotomous choice (make 
versus buy), and have examined financial attributes, outsourcing risks, contract design (type, 
complexity, and duration) as the determinants of outsourcing and its consequences (Boyne 1998; 
Brown and Potoski 2003b; Fernandez 2007). While managing the outsourcing process has been 
acknowledged as a challenge (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2009; Warner and Hefetz 2012), 
research on outsourcing process from the organizational behavioural perspective has rarely been 
conducted. We address this research need by focusing on the process of outsourcing at the 
organization level and investigate the influences of organizational mechanisms for making and 
implementing outsourcing decisions on the sustainability of those decisions in local 
governments. 
Outsourcing decisions are strategic decisions, managerial actions that reflect the internal 
and external behavior of organization (Boyne and Walker 2004). However, these decisions may 
not be sustainable because they could result in unintended consequences or outcomes (Boyne 
1998; Entwistle 2005; Sclar 2000). As such organizations can change their strategic actions and 
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return the outsourced activities “in-house”. The reversing decision has been referred to as 
“backsourcing” (Veltri, Saunders and Kavan 2008), “reverse contracting” (Miranda and Lerner 
1995), and “insourcing” (Warner and Hefetz 2012). Evidence suggests that reversing outsourcing 
decisions occurs frequently (Hefetz and Warner 2004; Young and Macinati 2012). For example, 
Warner and Hefetz’s (2012) study of outsourcing and insourcing in U.S. local governments in 
the 2002-2007 period finds that the rate of insourcing is approximately equal to the rate of new 
outsourcing.  
Similar to outsourcing, we consider insourcing as a strategic decision intended to enhance 
the conduct and outcomes of public organizations. When outsourcing of a service produces the 
intended outcomes, it will be sustained. When it does not, the organization may either switch the 
contractor or provider or reverse the outsourcing strategy. The switching of contractors does not 
represent a strategic change, rather it is the continuation of the previously enacted outsourcing 
strategy. Insourcing, on the other hand, indicates that the outsourcing strategy has been changed 
(Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2008). Academic studies of insourcing relative to outsourcing 
are scarce (Hefetz and Warner 2004; Young and Macinati 2012). Since insourcing of outsourced 
activities can occur in any function or unit of the organization, we posit that the sustainability of 
outsourcing strategy and occurrence of insourcing depends on the public agency’s competency in 
managing the outsourcing decision process.  
We rely on the decision-making and strategy process models from the organization 
management and public management literature (Brown 2010; Bryson 2011; Dean and Sharfman 
1996). We ground our arguments on the concepts and insights from organizational behavior, 
adaptation and capability research (Bryson, Ackermann and Eden 2007; Cyert and March 1992; 
Piening 2013). The organizational behavioural theories provide an alternative to the economics 
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of organization. They open up the organization black box, involve human activities, and account 
for organizational mechanisms (e.g., decision making, resource allocation, performance 
monitoring) that enable producing and delivering services efficiently and effectively (Cyert and 
March 1963, 1992). As adaptive systems, organizations learn from their outsourcing experiences 
and alter their outsourcing processes to cope with changes in the environment and to preserve 
consistency and harmony among their internal activities (Cyert and March 1992; Piening 2013). 
We propose that over time continued refinement of organizational mechanisms associated with 
making and implementing outsourcing decisions could evolve into an operational capability that 
enable organizations to make more effective decisions.  
This study seeks to contribute to outsourcing and insourcing research in public 
organizations in several ways. First, it focuses on the under-researched area of the outsourcing 
process, and examines the influence of organizational mechanisms associated with making and 
implementing outsourcing decisions on the insourcing of outsourced services. Second, we study 
outsourcing decisions from a behavioural perspective, adding new insights to explanations of 
outsourcing decisions from economics and political theories. Third, longitudinal research on 
insourcing of organizational activities is scarce. The existing studies are primarily comparative 
case studies (Young and Macinati 2012) or examine a dichotomous outsource-insource decision 
(Brown, Potovski and Van Slyke 2008; Hefetz and Warner 2004; Warner and Hefetz 2012). We 
address this need by conducting a large sample empirical study of insourcing outsourced services 
using a six-panel dataset extending 25 years in seven areas: public works/transportation, public 
utilities, public safety, health and human services, parks and recreation, cultural and arts services, 
and support functions. Fourth, our study contributes to practice by informing public managers of 
mechanisms for the effective management of outsourcing process to help save organizational 
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resources.  
THEORY 
Outsourcing and insourcing 
Outsourcing is defined as a strategic decision to transfer organizational activities (delivery of 
services; administrative systems; information systems) or sub-activities (delivery of parts of 
services; payroll; data centre) to outside suppliers (Brown and Potoski 2003b; Brown, Potoski 
and Van Slyke 2009). Governments outsource to achieve economic efficiency, concentrate on 
their core competency, fulfil political ideology, or ease managing units and processes (Hodge 
2000; Young and Macinati 2012).  
A strategic decision is a long-term decision and organizations tend to sustain the decision 
rather than reverse it momentarily. However, as with other managerial decisions, strategy 
decisions are “contingent decisions” and their outcome is uncertain (Rogers 2003). Forecasting 
ahead may involve error, and managers’ capacity to recognize and factor future potential hazards 
in their decisions is limited (Brown 2010; Cyert and March 1992). An outsourcing decision that 
does not meet the anticipated outcomes could motivate a follow-up decision to enter a new 
contractual agreement, switch the supplier, or discontinue outsourcing (Hefetz and Warner 2004; 
Young and Macinati 2012). We consider the first two choices as continuations of the outsourcing 
strategy and study the third choice as a strategic change. 
Insourcing is a managerial decision to abandon outsourcing and bring the production of 
the products or services back in-house.1 Replacement can be substitution of a strategy with 
another strategy new to the organization or by one known to it Greve (1995). The decision to 
                                                 
1Organizations insource due to organization-specific features, environmental demands and opportunities, market 
conditions including the quality and availability of contractors, cost considerations, product and service quality, 
contract management issues, loss of control and political support (Veltri, Saunders and Kavan 2008; Young and 
Macinati 2012).   
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insource demonstrates that the outsourcing decision has been unsuccessful, or lost its 
effectiveness or support. Dean and Sharfman (1996) define strategy decision effectiveness by the 
extent of achievement of objectives set at the time of the decision. Hickson, Miller and Wilson 
(2003) define success of a decision by its performance achievement over time. We build on these 
definitions and consider that the effectiveness of outsourcing decisions are manifested by their 
continuance or discontinuance. Continuance of outsourcing conveys the strategy is perceived to 
be effective; discontinuance conveys that the strategy is ineffective and would need to be 
changed. Making and implementing outsourcing decisions require organizational resources, 
including organizational leaders’ scarce time. As insourcing may not necessarily produce 
beneficial outcomes, it would be reasonable to expect that as long as the outsourcing decision is 
perceived relatively advantageous insourcing will not be enacted. 2  Thus, we posit that the 
sustainability of an outsourcing decision is (inversely) coupled with the insourcing of that 
decision, and learning from the management of outsourcing process could help organizations 
make more effective and sustainable outsourcing decisions.3 
Outsourcing Process 
The decision-making process is usually studied as a sequence of sub-processes such as 
“formulation” and “implementation” in strategy, “initiation” and “implementation” in innovation 
adoption, and “contracting” and “monitoring” in outsourcing. The pairs are separated by the 
adoption-decision and represent, respectively, the pre- and post-adoption decision phases of the 
outsourcing decision process (hereafter, decision and implementation phase). The organizational 
                                                 
2 An organization may insource for a variety of reasons. This could be due to issues within the contract, 
unavailability of contractor or failure by the contractor – see the notable recent case of Carillion in the UK. When 
examining the sustainability of outsourcing, such changes suggest that the outsourcing strategy is no longer 
effective. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point. 
3 It would also be reasonable to expect that organizations, as adaptive systems, act to alter the insourcing strategy 
when deemed ineffective. Capturing the dynamics of outsourcing and insourcing over time requires an analysis of 
multiple, sequential episodes of strategy change, which is not the goal of our study. 
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actions for making and implementing decisions associated with the two phases are respectively 
referred to as “decision mechanisms” and “implementation mechanisms.”  
The goal of decision mechanisms is to enable making viable, reasonable, and effective 
outsourcing decisions. The decision phase includes recognizing need, searching for solutions, 
evaluating alternatives, and making the choice (Bryson 2011; Rogers 2003). Since politicians 
and top managers are responsible for making strategic decisions, we assume they are involved in 
this process due to their positional power. However, public organizations differ in the extent to 
which they involve non-managers in the decision-making process. We thus focus on the 
decentralization of decision-making and account for organizational heterogeneity in the extent of 
participation of internal actors (employees) and external actors (users, experts, early adopters) in 
the decision-making process (Andrews et al. 2009; Elbanna, Andrews and Pollanen 2016). 
The goal of implementation mechanisms is to ensure that the selected strategy is executed 
properly, stays on course, and fulfils expectations. Criteria for successful implementation are 
twofold: (1) organization wide roll-out and widespread use; and (2) continued user satisfaction 
and satisfactory performance (Bryson 2011; Real and Poole 2005). First, organizations often 
implement strategy incrementally or gradually, piloting it in one or few parts, adjusting and 
improving it to receive acceptance, and then rolling it out across the organization (Boyne et al. 
2005; Daft 2001; Rogers 2003). Second, organizations monitor costs, continued use, user 
satisfaction, and performance effects. The first part of implementation phase is mostly controlled 
by the organization, the second part is also influenced by external factors (Real and Poole 2005). 
We account for organizational heterogeneity in the gradual roll-out and continued performance 
monitoring of the implementation phase. 
Learning is an ongoing process for gaining insights and knowledge and acting on them 
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(Kotter 1996). Since outsourcing of functions and services is also a continuing organizational 
activity, over time, organizations can learn from both decision and implementation mechanisms. 
Hence, we consider the outsourcing process as an organizational learning process where 
organizations gain experience, analyse effective and ineffective past decisions, and refine the 
decision rules to make better choices. Cumulated experiences from outsourcing functions and 
services over time could become common organizational knowledge and facilitate future 
learning for managing the outsourcing process (Rashman and Radnor 2010). Learning through 
experience helps fine-tune the decision and implementation mechanisms, establish heuristics that 
link them together, and result in a reliable outsourcing process that can be used to make 
successful decisions. Therefore, assuming that the outcomes of past decisions accumulate to 
better future decisions, we account for the influence of decision and implementation mechanisms 
on the continued effectiveness of outsourcing decisions.  
Decision Mechanisms 
Cyert and March’s (1963) organizational behavioural theory advanced that decision-making is 
constrained by uncertainty in preferences and consequences of current actions, and by limitations 
in the decision makers’ rationality and cognition. The appropriateness and consequences of new 
actions are uncertain and decision makers’ ideas and intellectual capacity to process information 
are limited, making reliance on other sources of information crucial for the quality of 
organizational choices (Cyert and March 1992). Research on strategy and innovation decision 
process endorse the participatory and consultative style of decision-making over the direct and 
hierarchical style (Andrews et al. 2009; Daft 2001). The advocacy for more participatory 
decision-making has come about in public organizations with the advent of the new public 
governance and collaborative innovation (Ansell and Torfing 2014) that place emphasis on 
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“more attention to citizen deliberation and voice” and “a decision-making process that integrates 
market mechanisms with citizen deliberation” (Warner and Hefetz 2012, 315). Together, these 
concepts and theories call for the participation of non-managers in the decision-making process 
on the assumption that their technical and administrative knowledge and experiences supplement 
those of top managers and help them to make informed and reasonable decisions.  
Participation of internal actors in the decision process assists in making wholesome 
decisions due to diversity of opinion, knowledge-base, and skill-set (Andrews et al. 2009; 
Elbanna, Andrews and Pollenan 2016). Decentralization of decision-making also widens 
communication channels, improves organizational members’ awareness and commitment, 
facilitates cross-pollination of ideas, and increases the quantity and quality of knowledge 
retrieved from the external environment (Andrews et al. 2009; Black and Gregersen 1997). The 
range and depth of functional and technical knowledge of those involved in the decision process 
affects to the quality of the search, selection, and evaluation of alternative solutions. In sum, we 
account for the extent of participation of employees because it increases cognitive or preference 
diversity and influences the comprehensiveness of the outcome.  
Participation of external actors in the decision-making process can also influence the 
quality and appropriability of the decisions (Boyer, Van Slyke and Rogers 2016). Their 
involvement reflects the organization’s tendency to value external knowledge and learn from the 
ideas and experiences of early adopters, service suppliers, industry experts, users and clients. For 
the same reasons offered for organizational members, the external actors provide additional 
know-how for making outsourcing decisions for which the focal organization’s internal 
knowledge and experience is inadequate. External actors are sources of new knowledge and 
expertise that go beyond the experiences of the focal organization and its members (Crosby and 
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Bryson 2005). For instance, the involvement of service recipients and citizen advisory groups 
help reduce uncertainty in outsourcing services that the users might view unnecessary or 
unacceptable. Likewise, the participation of suppliers and industry experts in the process can 
help avoid selecting programs that have not succeeded in similar jurisdictions, and thereby enrich 
the relevance and quality of the decision.  
While participatory decision-making provides access to additional knowledge and 
information, non-managers may sway the organization towards self-interested positions. For 
example, internal actors may advocate to keep in-house activities to save jobs, and external 
actors may lobby the organization to contract out activities to their entities. Yet, we propose that 
in balance participation of both internal and external actors shall provide the decision makers 
with more information and insight than they would otherwise have, reduce decision uncertainty, 
and increase their ability to make better choices (Cyert and March 1992). We thus propose that 
experience and heuristics from participatory decision-making will assist organizations to make 
more sustainable outsourcing decisions thereby decreasing their reversal. 
Hypothesis 1: Participation of non-managers in making outsourcing decisions will 
increase the sustainability of outsourcing. 
Implementation Mechanisms 
Although implementation is vital for the success of strategic decisions (Brown and Potoski 
2003a), most strategic decision models do not include implementation (Andrews et al. 2011). 
Yet, the failure of decisions is more closely associated with implementing than making the 
decision (Nutt 1989). Compared with the decision phase, the implementation phase is more 
detailed, challenging, and organization-specific. It includes more actors, faces more conflict and 
tension, resistance to change is unavoidable, and careful planning and ample resources cannot 
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guarantee success (Bryson and Anderson 2000; Daft 2001). Hence, organizations require to put 
in place mechanisms to roll-out and monitor implementation to obtain success.  
Gradual roll-out or incremental implementation enables the organization to learn from 
experience and adapt. Organizations applying this mechanism by implementation on a trial basis 
(piloting), adjust organizational processes and systems, allure cooperation of managers and 
employees, learn about managing the relationship with suppliers, and acquire knowledge for 
sustaining use (Boyne et al. 2005; Buuren and Loorbach 2009). By gradual roll-out, 
organizations learn from their own experience and the experiences of others (consultants, early 
adopters, users) to attain implementation effectiveness. Using the internal and external sources of 
learning inform managers to overcome obstacles to implementation, lay down the technical and 
social groundwork, build and manage relationship with suppliers, and address the sources of 
resistance to change (Dibbern et al. 2004; Greve 1995). 
Performance monitoring describes organizational actions to measure the outcome of 
outsourcing decisions regularly so that managers can choose to continue or discontinue 
outsourcing (Moynihan 2008). Monitoring is an essential but understudied phase of outsourcing 
decisions, and strategy decision process in general. Without monitoring, learning from the 
decision-making will be incomplete and knowledge for the development of reliable and 
satisfactory outsourcing process could not be obtained. To be effective, monitoring mechanisms 
should be regular rather than episodic, employ multiple criteria (goal attainment; cost; user 
satisfaction), and install techniques and metrics (survey; observation; financial analysis) for 
measuring efficiency and effectiveness (Moynihan 2008; Weiss 1972). In the context of this 
study, for instance, regular monitoring includes (1) the collection and analysis of financial data to 
enable measuring the efficiency of operations and control costs, and (2) the surveying of citizens 
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and monitoring of their complaints via field observations to assess the quality of service 
provision.  
Incremental implementation and performance monitoring help ensure that outsourcing 
decisions are implemented across the organization smoothly and produce the expected outcomes. 
Dibbern et al.’s (2004) review of IS outsourcing found that implementation effectiveness and 
outsourcing success are interdependent. We propose that insights gained from the gradual roll-
out and regular monitoring help establish competencies for the implementation of outsourcing 
that will allow organizations to make more sustainable outsourcing decisions thereby decreasing 
their reversal.    
Hypothesis 2: Gradual roll-out (H2a) and regular monitoring (H2b) in implementing 
outsourcing decisions will increase the sustainability of outsourcing.   
METHODS 
Data 
We tested our hypotheses using data from the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA) surveys of Alternative Service Delivery (ASD). Starting in 1982, the ICMA 
has surveyed U.S. local governments every five years regarding the modes of provision (e.g., in-
house, outsourced) of 64 public services. The questionnaires are sent to a stratified random 
sample (based on population) of city managers or chief administrative officers of municipal and 
county governments. The number of organizations that responded to each survey ranged from 
1,283 to 1,777, reflecting a response rate of 24-32% (http://www.icma.org). These data were 
supplemented with data from the U.S. Census City and County Data Book (U.S. Census) and 
Brown and Potoski’s (2003b) expert survey of 36 city managers/mayors. 
This study’s unit of analysis is the organization (local government). The ASD survey asks 
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the respondents to answer questions about making and implementing outsourcing decisions at 
their organization. We focused our analysis on services produced in-house (by the employees of 
the organization) or privatized (produced by private suppliers). The ASD questionnaires define 
privatization (“private service delivery”) as when a service is provided through “private for-
profit,” “private non-profit,” “franchise/concessions,” or “subsidies.”4 We merged the data from 
each available ASD survey, resulting in a longitudinal, unbalanced dataset of six panels (1982, 
1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007). To our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze all 
published ASD panels. 
Since insourcing is defined as bringing outsourced services back-in house, we excluded 
all organizations that did not respond to at least two sequential surveys on either in-house or 
outsourced (privatized) provision of services to allow for capturing the change in the provision of 
a service from in-house to outsourced. This resulted in a sample of 1,650 organizations and 4,729 
organization-year observations (hereafter observations). Then, to estimate changes in the mode 
of provision of services from outsourced back to in-house, we limited the sample to 
organizations that provided at least one service via privatization in the prior period to reflect the 
observations that may potentially insource. This resulted a sample of 1,468 organizations and 
2,524 observations, which we use for the analyses. 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
Insourcing is the proportion of services insourced by the focal organization. Specifically, 
insourcing is measured as the sum of services in the focal organization that changed from 
outsourced in the prior period to in-house in the current period, divided by the total number of 
                                                 
4 Services provided by private for profit, private non-profit, franchise concessions, and subsidies represent 78.9%, 
11.6%, 6.6%, and 2.9% of outsourcing observations, respectively. 
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services the organization outsourced in the prior period. We rely on a proportion to control for 
differences across organizations in the number of services outsourced.  
Independent variables 
To operationalize decision and implementation mechanisms we used four questions from the 
ASD surveys, two related to the participation of internal and external actors for making, and two 
related to organizational actions for implementing, outsourcing decisions. We first selected the 
items that theoretically were relevant to our definition of decision mechanisms and 
implementation mechanisms and did not overlap with the other items in the survey questions.5 
We conducted exploratory factor analysis to help identify the relevant items. This procedure 
resulted in eight items for decision, and nine items for implementation, mechanisms. The items 
loaded into three factors: one factor including participation of both internal and external actors in 
deciding to outsource (hereafter participation), and two factors representing gradual roll-out and 
regular monitoring in implementing the decision. (The factors and their items are shown in 
Online Appendix 1.) Then we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to ensure that the three 
categories of items were empirically distinct. All items loaded onto their proposed factors and 
were significant (p<0.001) and the three-factor model fit the data well (χ2/df = 8.74, RMSEA = 
0.023, CFI = 0.989, TLI = 0.986). We used these three factors as the independent variables in the 
regression analysis, which were measured by the proportion of positive responses to the survey 
questions for a factor divided by the total number of question items of that factor.  
As stated earlier, we assumed that the members of the top management team 
                                                 
5 For participation, we excluded involvement by top management since virtually all organizations have top 
management involved in decision making and our key variable of interest is participation of lower-level employees. 
We also excluded items from the survey that were not theoretically relevant to our constructs such as recommending 
changes in state and local laws, using citizen advisory committees and consultants to assess private alternatives, and 
developing programs to minimize the effect of displaced workers.  
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(manager/chief administrative officer, assistant manager, department heads, and elected officials) 
are involved in the decision-making process due to their positional power. Participation, 
therefore, represents the involvement of non-managers both inside and outside of the 
organization, and was measured by the proportion of positive answers to whether five different 
internal groups and three different external groups were involved in the process (see Online 
Appendix 2). Implementation mechanisms are represented by two variables. Gradual roll-out 
was measured by the proportion of positive responses to three activities, and regular monitoring 
was measured by the proportion of positive responses to six activities (see Online Appendix 2). 
Control variables 
We controlled for environmental, organizational, and service levels variables that could affect 
the decision to privatize public services and capacity of governments to manage contracts (i.e. 
the decision and implementation mechanisms) that had precedence in the literature (e.g. Hefetz 
and Warner 2004). Since economic conditions can influence organizational decisions, we 
controlled for income per capita of the jurisdiction to gauge organizations’ financial resources 
because high levels of economic munificence are likely associated with greater contract 
management capacity (Brown and Potoski 2003a). Income per capita was measured as the 
average income of constituents from the U.S. Census, adjusted for inflation using the consumer 
price index (CPI) with 1982 as the base year. Differences may exist in the bureaucracies (scale 
advantages, resources, and access to service suppliers) between large and small organizations 
that influence their propensity to contract, and their capacity to manage decision processes 
(Boyne et al. 2005; Brown and Potoski 2003b). We controlled for the size of the local 
government community using the natural log of the population in its jurisdiction collected from 
the U.S. Census. It is anticipated that large jurisdictions will have a greater capacity to manage 
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contracts thereby reducing insourcing.  
Institutional arrangements are likely to influence choice in service delivery by setting 
rules and norms of behaviour across organizations. Council-manager and strong-major 
governments are predicated on the assumption that a government should be managed like a 
private firm (Brown and Potoski 2003a). Further, council-manager governments are members of 
the ICMA, which promotes contracting as a norm (Brown and Potoski 2003b). Brown and 
Potoski (2003a, b) show that council-manager governments are more likely to contract than 
strong-major governments and that their capacity for contract management is greater. 
Alternatively, local governments governed by town meetings or commissions may choose to 
contract services due to member ties to local networks. Hence, we controlled for whether the 
local government structure was headed by a nonelected administrator/manager (County-
manager), collective group (Collective), or by an elected official (Elected) with a categorical 
variable. The variable was coded County-manager if its form of government is council-manager 
or council-administrator, Collective if its form of government is a commission, town meeting, or 
representative town meeting, and Elected if its form of government is a mayor-council or 
council-elected executive.  
Local governments under pressure to enhance efficiency typically privatize (Bel and 
Fegeda 2007). Thus, we controlled for fiscal pressure, and measured it by the proportion of 
positive answers to whether the organization indicated that it: (1) had state or federal mandates 
tied to intergovernmental financing, and/or (2) was under external fiscal pressure for 
outsourcing. Local governments under fiscal pressure to outsource are anticipated to have 
limitations in the management of contracts because the fiscal pressure that led to contracting is 
likely to be associated with weaker capacity to maintain ongoing contract management (Brown 
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and Potoski 2003a). Since, organizations may face contractual constraints that inhibit them from 
abandoning their outsourcing strategy, we controlled for restrictive labour contracts using a 
binary indicator for whether the organization indicated in the ASD surveys that restrictive labour 
contracts or agreements were an obstacle in outsourcing the services.  
To take into account the effects of transaction costs, we controlled for asset specificity 
(AS) and service measurability (SM) of the services provided by the organization using Brown 
and Potoski’s (2003b) expert survey. 6  AS and SM, which are respectively associated with 
“specialized investment” required to provide a service and “difficulty of measuring and 
monitoring” a service, are two types of service level attributes that affect costs and reflect the 
complexity of the contracted service (Brown and Potoski 2003b). As the costs of services 
outsourced in the prior period should affect the proportion of services insourced in the current 
period, we calculated AS and SM for insourcing as the mean ratings of asset specificity and 
service measurability for the organization’s outsourced services in the prior period. 
We also controlled for program group and panel year. The ASD surveys classify the 64 
services into seven groups: public works/transportation, public utilities, public safety, health and 
human services, parks and recreation, cultural and arts services, and support functions. To 
account for variation in the type of services, we controlled for program group calculated as the 
number of services provided in each group, divided by the total number of services provided by 
the organization. The differences in the propensity to insource in any given year were controlled 
via year fixed-effects.  
Analysis 
                                                 
6 Brown and Potoski conducted an expert survey of 36 local government managers and asked them to rate AS and 
SM for each service on a 5-point scale, with higher values indicating that the service requires greater specialized 
investments or is more difficult to measure and monitor. They reported the mean ratings of AS and SM for the 64 
public services (Brown and Potoski 2003b, 451-452). 
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Endogeneity, which occurs when explanatory variables are correlated with the error term, is a 
concern in organization studies. Frequently, endogeneity arises from problems with “reverse 
causality” or “omitted variables” that affect both the dependent and independent variables. The 
key concern for endogeneity in our analysis may arise from omitted variables.7 Organizations 
that are more engaged in the outsourcing process might have some unobserved features that also 
affect their propensity to insource outsourced services. We therefore employed fixed effects 
linear regression for data analysis in order to control for unobserved organizational factors that 
might influence the insourcing decision (Greene 2007).  
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations of key variables for insourcing. On 
average, organizations insourced 34 percent of the programs that were outsourced, indicating that 
a relatively large portion of outsourcing decisions are reversed over time.8 The most common 
services insourced were heavy equipment, emergency, vehicle maintenance, buildings/grounds 
maintenance, legal services, operation and maintenance of recreation facilities, street repair, and 
data processing. Among the independent variables, organizations on average had a participation 
index of 25%, indicating that they involved approximately one-quarter of the internal and 
external actors in the process. Compared to participation, the gradual roll-out was lower (15%), 
and regular monitoring was higher (41%). As expected correlations between these three process 
variables were significant (r=.30, .36, and .31), reflecting the related nature of the sub-processes 
of the outsourcing process.  
                                                 
7 Reverse causality is not a concern as the theoretical variables in our model precede the dependent variable; that is, 
organizations first choose to outsource services and engage in the outsourcing process before deciding to reverse the 
outsourcing decision by backsourcing the activity. 
8  We also examined the descriptive statistics and correlations for each individual year. The proportion of 
backsourcing for each panel ranged from 26.9 percent to 40.8 percent, and the other results were generally 
consistent with those presented in Table 1. 
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----------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------- 
Table 2 presents the regression results for insourcing. We conducted hierarchical 
regression analysis, and entered the control variables first (Model 1), and then entered one at a 
time the theoretical variables of participation (Model 2), gradual roll-out (Model 3), and regular 
monitoring (Model 4) before entering all three independent variables (Model 5). The value of R-
squared increased from Model 1 to Model 5, indicating that Model 5 best fits the data. We also 
tested for multicollinearity by computing the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and found that 
they were between 1.0 and 1.5, below the recommended ceiling of 10 (Chatterjee and Price 
1991).  
------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------ 
 
 Hypothesis 1, which proposed that the extent of participation of non-managers in making 
the decision to outsource will reduce insourcing, was supported in Model 2 (p<.05). However, 
when the implementation mechanisms were entered, the coefficient for participation became 
nonsignificant (Model 5, p>.05). Hypothesis 2, which suggested that the implementation 
mechanisms of gradual roll-out (H2a) and regular monitoring (H2b) negatively affect insourcing, 
received full support as the coefficients for both factors were negative and significant (Models 3 
and 4, p<.05). The coefficient for gradual roll-out indicates that organizations that adopt all 
gradual roll-out items insource 7.2 percent fewer services than if they did not adopt any gradual 
roll-out items. On average, adopting one item in the index is associated with a 2.4 percent 
reduction in insourcing of services. Similarly, the coefficient for regular monitoring indicates 
that adopting all regular monitoring mechanisms is associated with 5.8 percent fewer services 
 21 
insourced than if the organization adopted no regular monitoring mechanisms. These results 
indicate that, on average, each regular monitoring mechanism adopted is associated with 
approximately a one percent decline in insourcing by the organization. Considering the control 
variables, the categorical controls for form of government were positive and significant (Model 
5, p<.05) indicating that relative to council-manager, local governments that change to elected or 
collective forms of government are positively associated with insourcing services.  
We conducted additional analyses to confirm the robustness of the results of the 
theoretical variables, and check effects of controls without fixed effects. Since the dependent 
variable is fractional, ranging from 0 to 1, we used a fractional logit model (Papke and 
Wooldridge 1996). The results for the three theoretical variables of were significant (p<.001), 
and consistent with those reported in Table 2. We also tested the sensitivity of our results to 
dropping control variables, removing them from the model one at a time, and in combinations. 
The results generally remained consistent with those reported in Table 2. (Robustness results are 
available on request from authors).  
Overall, the results generally support our study’s main thesis—that organizational 
mechanisms for effective management of outsourcing process could affect the intensity of 
insourcing. More specifically, our findings suggest that (1) while the decentralization of 
decision-making might influence outsourcing decisions, it might not have a lasting effect on 
insourcing; and (2) the implementation mechanisms are the salient process factors that affect the 
insourcing of outsourced services.  
DISCUSSION 
Drawing on behavioural and adaptation theories we studied outsourcing strategy, focused on 
outsourcing as a process, and examined the role of decision and implementation mechanisms. 
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While organizations strive to make optimal decisions, outsourcing decisions may not succeed, 
prompting organizations to bring the production of activities back in-house. We proposed that 
the sustainability of outsourcing strategy matters because insourcing involves organizational 
change, which requires resources. The results from the influences of three process mechanisms 
on the occurrence of insourcing indicated that implementation mechanisms affect the 
sustainability of outsourcing and thereby the likelihood of insourcing. We discuss the 
implications of our findings for research on the management of the outsourcing process as a 
specific capability and a potential source of organizations’ effectiveness of outsourcing 
decisions.  
Outsourcing and Insourcing 
While review studies of outsourcing process, and case studies of insourcing have been conducted 
(Dibbern et al. 2004; Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005, Young and Macinati 2012), large 
sample research beyond dichotomous outsource-insource decisions have not been conducted. We 
constructed a panel dataset over a 25-year period to pursue this line of inquiry and bring attention 
to several important research areas: the aftermath of the outsourcing decision; the why and how 
of insourcing occurrence; and the role of the outsourcing process as an organizational capability. 
Brown and Potoski (2003a) identify contract-management capacities. This study adds by 
pointing out the role of the outsourcing process capability—local governments’ capability to 
develop processes for adopting and implementing effective outsourcing decisions that could 
produce continued satisfactory outcomes. 
Our findings on adoption mechanisms suggest the need for a more in-depth 
conceptualization of the role stakeholder involvement and collaboration on the sustainability of 
outsourcing decision. We draw on evidence that points towards the ways in which participatory 
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decision-making justifies the role of stakeholder involvement (Andrews et al. 2009; Boyer, Van 
Slyke and Rogers 2016; Uster, Beeri and Vashdi 2018). Our findings regarding the influence of 
implementation mechanisms on the sustainability of outsourcing points out the importance of 
probing and understanding the post-adoption processes for execution of outsourcing strategy and 
evaluation of its effectiveness (also see Hefetz and Warner [2004] for similar findings for a two-
data point time period). When the adoption and implementation mechanisms are considered 
together, however, longitudinal results indicate that gradual implementation and regular 
monitoring mechanisms influence insourcing, but involvement of internal and external actors 
does not (Model 5, Table 2). This finding confirms the necessity of studying outsourcing as a 
process rather than a dichotomous decision that drove our study. It demonstrates as the process 
of outsourcing unfolds over time the influence of the adoption mechanisms on the effectiveness 
of the process gives way to the implementation mechanisms. That is, effectiveness of an 
outsourcing decision hinges on its successful implementation, not on eloquence of its adoption. 
This is a major gap in research on governance choice, which primarily focus on the adoption 
decision rather than scrutinizing the entire process. Further studies to better explain the relative 
influence of adoption and implementation mechanisms, including the role of collaboration, are 
called for. 
The last two ASD surveys (2002 and 2007) included an additional question asking 
respondents to indicate whether their organization insourced any of the services in the last five 
years, and if it did, what factors from a list of six influenced the decision.9 The three primary 
reasons were to do with the outcomes of contracting: nearly two-thirds (64.8 percent) of 
respondents rated unsatisfactory service quality as the primary reason for insourcing outsourced 
                                                 
9 Of the total of 2,882 respondents in the two surveys, 2,681 (93%) answered this question, and 586 (21.9%) 
indicated that they had insourced previously outsourced services. 
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services; one-half (50.9 percent) identified insufficient cost savings; and a third (34.1 percent) 
stated reasons for improvements in organization efficiency. Internal decisions or contract 
management problems accounted for smaller proportion of reasons for insourcing. 10  These 
anecdotal evidences suggest that lack of success or problems with outsourcing dominate the 
reasons for bringing the service back in house, reinforcing the importance of understanding 
outsourcing capabilities and processes.  
Overall, our findings point out the cumulative effect of outsourcing adoption and 
implementation mechanisms on the sustainability of outsourcing decisions. They suggest that 
outsourcing process influences insourcing more strongly when client organizations develop and 
utilize mechanisms for implementation. However, research on implementation mechanisms is 
often overlooked in favour of understanding conditions that necessitate and facilitate adoption 
decisions. Despite challenges in studying implementation, we recommend more research on the 
implementation of outsourcing as the success of strategic decisions depends on all the steps 
organizations take to make and execute them.  
Outsourcing Process Capability 
Capabilities or competencies represent the ability of organizations to combine different resources 
to engage in productive activities and meet objectives (Bryson, Ackerman and Eden 2007; 
Piening 2013). Organizational capability has been defined broadly and includes key terms such 
as knowledge, skills, routines, experience, and complementary assets (Bryson, Ackerman and 
Eden 2007). An overarching theme of this perspective is the importance of routines or processes 
embedded in the organization that enable continuous satisfactory performance of one or more 
                                                 
10Less than two in ten decisions to insource (18.6 percent) were the direct result of political support for a change in 
strategy, followed by problems with contract monitoring (18.1 percent) and problems with contract specification 
(11.9 percent).   
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activity (Helfat and Winter 2011). These processes are refined through organizational experience 
and learning, and influence managerial decision-making. Organizational processes and routines 
can eventually become unique, difficult to measure and valuable, a source of organizational 
effectiveness, and growth (Bryson, Ackermann and Eden 2007; Klein et al. 2013). 
 Strategy research delineates that governance decisions are driven by organizational 
resources and capabilities, and, in the case of contracting, by the relative competencies of the 
client organization and potential contractors (Boyne and Walker 2004; Brown and Potoski 
2003b; Bryson, Berry and Yang 2010). Organizations produce products and services in-house 
when they fit organizational competencies and outsource them when suppliers have greater 
abilities or low internal congruencies make in-house production inefficient. The outsourcing 
process know-how develops gradually through activation and deactivation of outsourcing and 
insourcing decisions. Eventually, it assists organizations to make effective outsourcing decisions, 
reducing the need to insource. In this vein, the enactment and refinement of outsourcing process 
mechanisms could become a specific capability that enables organizations to make the 
governance decisions reliability and satisfactorily (Helfat and Winter 2011). Our study provides 
early evidence for this view in public service organizations by finding that adoption and 
implementation mechanisms of the outsourcing public services collectively affect the 
appropriability of outsourcing decisions and decrease the proportion of outsourced decisions that 
are subsequently insourced. 
The concept of capability has been applied mainly to business organizations operating in 
complex and competitive environments. However, patterns of capabilities can vary with 
organizational environment dynamism. That is, in more stable environments organizational 
processes need not necessarily be rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable, and can exhibit 
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commonalities across effective organizations (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). This argument 
opens up the application of capabilities to public organizations, which operate in such 
environmental conditions. In the public context, specific operating procedures (Cyert and March 
1992) or operational capabilities suffice to attain sustained “minimally satisfactory performance” 
(Helfat and Winter 2011).11  Operating procedures overlap with the process of learning and 
change articulated in the adaptation literature (Greve 1995). They enable organizations perform 
their activities on an on-going basis using more or less the same techniques on the same scale. It 
is in this sense that we relied on organizational adaptation and behaviour to study outsourcing 
and insourcing, and envisage the outsourcing process as an operational capability that can be 
developed to assist organizations carry out their services reliably and satisfactorily. Future 
research in outsourcing and insourcing of other activities in public service organizations can 
further explore this view.  
Implications for Research on Private and Public Services  
Research on the outsourcing of public services is influenced by the underlying economic 
assumption of TCE and PCT. Whereas the influence of cost efficiency is undeniable, since a 
straight trade-off between cost and quality of services under either public or private provision 
cannot be made, the efficacy of cost-quality ratio as an important factor in the governance mode 
choice is rather uncertain. For instance, the prevailing assumptions that privatization of public 
services will lead to higher efficiency and lower cost, and public organizations and their 
                                                 
11 Helfat and Winter (2011) distinguish between dynamic and operational (or ordinary) capabilities. Dynamic 
capabilities “aim to promote seemingly large amounts of change in a short period of time,” suggesting that they 
enable a firm to change the way it carries out its activities for superior performance (Helfat and Winter 2011, 1243-
1244). Operational capabilities enable an organization to perform its activities on “an on-going basis using more or 
less the same techniques on the same scale to support existing products and services for the same customer 
application’ (Helfat and Winter 2011, 1244). The line between the dynamic and operational capability is blurry 
(Helfat and Winter 2011); however, the dynamic capability as conceptualized for business organizations in high 
velocity markets does not apply to public organizations; only operational capability does. 
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employees are not motivated to innovate to reduce cost or increase quality, are likely over 
generalized (Hodge 2000; Homsy 2018; Sclar 2000; Warner and Hefetz 2012). The consistent 
rate of insourcing within the 25-year span of our dataset suggests that future research on the 
governance mode choice of public services would need to balance the economic efficiencies of 
private ownership with the social benefits of public services by probing various contingencies on 
the cost-quality ratio. For instance, when organizations’ resources are abundant, contracts could 
be more lucrative and private providers would deliver quality services, resulting in citizen 
satisfaction. When the resources are limited and contracts are tight, the quality of service 
provision could drop, resulting in citizen dissatisfaction. 
There has been ongoing calls for the application of strategy theories and methods to study 
public organizations (Bryson, Ackermann and Eden 2007; Bryson, Berry and Yang 2010; Klein 
et al. 2013). This study is a step forward in addressing this research need. On one hand, our 
arguments on the importance of organizational processes in strategic decisions attest to Klein et 
al.’s (2013) arguments in support of strategy theories and methods in understanding public 
organizations. On the other hand, our theory and findings provide further evidence that the 
strategic decision process in local governments is different to that in the private context. For 
instance, in a study of IS sourcing decisions Jain and Thietart (2013) found that capabilities 
associated with organizational processes decrease the likelihood of outsourcing. 12  Future 
research should further probe the application of concepts and methodologies from the private to 
the public context, and vice versa. 
The examination of the effects of outsourcing process mechanisms on insourcing is 
                                                 
12 Major differences in datasets, analytical methods, and study contexts forbid a true comparison of Jain and 
Thietart’s (2013) findings with those of this study. Jain and Thietart’s study is cross-sectional and focuses on the 
role of production and governance costs on outsourcing decisions; our study is longitudinal and focuses on the role 
of outsourcing process on insourcing decisions. 
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scarce. Hence, our findings should be validated by future research on outsourcing and insourcing 
of other functions and services in both business and public organizations. Learning from research 
in public and private contexts is reciprocal, suggesting that our application and extension of 
behavioural/adaptation approach to outsourcing and insourcing in public organizations could 
help advance the understanding of the dynamics of outsourcing and insourcing in business 
organizations. Since organizations in every industry and sector, private or public, may 
continually outsource and insource their activities, research on effective management of the 
process of outsourcing and insourcing can contribute to both theory and practice. 
This study also has several implications for public administrators/mangers. First, 
considering the number of outsourcing and subsequent insourcing of outsourced services, public 
managers should be cognizant that outsourcing is not merely a decision to make but process to 
manage. Effective management of outsourcing process increases its sustainability and reduces 
insourcing of outsourced services. Second, the results suggest that in the early stages of 
outsourcing process, input from internal and external sources of information and knowledge 
assist sustainability of the outsourcing decision. Hence, public managers are advised to seek 
input from middle managers, as well as non-managers, and find ways of involving them in the 
process. Third, senior managers are often more keen about the pre-adoption phase of decision 
making than the post-adoption phase. Simply put, making a decision is more fun than 
implementing it. Our findings highlight the crucial impact of roll-out and monitoring 
mechanisms, suggesting that public managers would need to be as involved in the 
implementation phase as they are in the adoption phase. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to our study that should be considered in interpreting its findings. 
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First, we study insourcing as the discontinuation of outsourcing (not updating contracts or 
switching providers) and posit that an effective outsourcing process will result in fewer 
insourcing occurrences. Our data do not allow us to empirically test performance outcomes of 
outsourcing in order to determine whether they mediate the occurrence of insourcing. Future 
studies which utilize both qualitative and quantitative data on the management processes used for 
outsourcing and their performance consequences can provide additional insights. Second, the 
dataset used in this analysis does not allow us to explore questions of political ideology that may 
impact on outsourcing and insourcing decisions within the focal organization, or at other levels 
of government. Similarly, we do not have data on local government organizations’ shareholdings 
in local service providers, thus cannot control whether outsourcing or insourcing decisions are 
influenced by their local network membership. Since the membership of local networks is 
increasing, the examination of this timely issue on governance choices are highly 
recommended. 13  Third, we studied outsourcing and insourcing of privatization, the most 
prominent mode of outsourcing in governmental organizations. However, it is possible that local 
governments outsource services to neighbouring cities and counties instead of private providers. 
In the same vein, in addition to producing services fully in-house or outsourcing them 
completely, organizations may choose a cooperative mode of service provision, where 
organizations and providers offer services jointly. Future studies of the role of outsourcing 
process on different types of outsourcing, and conditions under which each may occur, could 
provide a fuller understanding of insourcing of public services. Fourth, we studied outsourcing 
and insourcing from the perspective of client organizations, which represents one side of the 
contractual relationship. The success of outsourcing strategy depends on the quality of 
                                                 
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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relationships between the parties, and cannot be explained fully without data from both sides. 
Future studies can consider dyadic methods for including both parties to limit bias and provide 
insights on how client organizations learn from the interactions with providers and how that 
would affect the development of outsourcing process mechanisms.  
Despite these limitations, however, we have taken a step toward examining a challenging 
but promising research endeavour by highlighting the role of outsourcing process, applying 
behavioural theories to studies of outsourcing and insourcing, and investigating the role of 
adoption and implementation mechanisms. We hope that organization management scholars 
continue and advance this line of enquiry.   
CONCLUSION 
From TCE and PCT perspectives, the primary driving force for outsourcing has been efficiency, 
especially in government organizations that are perceived to be bureaucratic and inefficient. 
Also, previous research has examined outsourcing decisions mainly as events, not as a process. 
Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the outsourcing process as an organizational 
capability is scarce. We offered that over time the learning from outsourcing could result in a 
process that increases the sustainability of outsourcing decisions and reduce its reversal. Data 
analyses from a longitudinal dataset of outsourcing and insourcing of public services showed that 
insourcing is relatively common, and is influenced primarily by the implementation mechanisms 
of the outsourcing process. Future research can expand and extend the characterization of the 
outsourcing process as a specific capability to carry out effective transformation of resources to 
outcomes. We also recommend more research on the implementation mechanisms of governance 
mode choices. While there might be more interest in learning about the pre-adoption decision 
conditions that could affect outsourcing decisions, neither the effectiveness of managerial actions 
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nor the extent of organizational learning from previous actions can help future outsourcing 
decisions until the post-adoption processes of implementing and evaluating outcomes of the 
decisions are explained. The task is challenging as the implementation of a decision is more 
difficult to study than its adoption, but the effort will be essential in advancing theory and 
assisting practice.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
  Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Insourcing 0.34 0.33                      
2 Income Per Capita 9.52 0.25 -0.05                    
3 Population 10.65 1.06 -0.03 0.09                  
4 Elected 0.19 0.39 0.06 -0.06 -0.07                
5 Collective 0.08 0.27 0.03 -0.01 0.12 -0.14        
6 Fiscal Pressure 0.24 0.31 -0.04 0.05 0.13 -0.04 -0.01             
7 Restrictive Labour Contracts 0.19 0.39 -0.02 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.20           
8 AS 2.92 0.35 -0.03 -0.17 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.03         
9 SM 2.53 0.34 0.03 -0.08 0.14 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.54       
10 Participation 0.25 0.23 -0.07 0.03 0.32 -0.07 -0.03 0.35 0.16 0.01 0.03     
11 Gradual Roll-out 0.15 0.25 -0.12 0.09 0.15 -0.10 0.00 0.18 0.15 -0.02 0.02 0.30   
12 Regular Monitoring 0.41 0.41 -0.14 0.10 0.15 -0.09 -0.07 0.17 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.36 0.31 
 Number of Observations 2,524. All correlations greater than 0.04 or less than -0.04 are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 2. Fixed Effects Results for Insourcing 
Variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
  Coefficient 
Std 
error 
  Coefficient 
Std 
error 
  Coefficient 
Std 
error 
  Coefficient 
Std 
error 
  Coefficient 
Std 
error 
Constant 2.132 (1.603)   2.035 (1.594)   2.238 (1.585)   2.061 (1.573)   2.106 (1.563) 
Income Per Capita -0.051 (0.153)   -0.040 (0.152)   -0.061 (0.152)   -0.047 (0.152)   -0.050 (0.151) 
Population -0.120 (0.086)   -0.120 (0.086)   -0.120 (0.085)   -0.114 (0.086)   -0.116 (0.085) 
Electeda 0.289* (0.130)   0.294* (0.133)   0.293* (0.127)   0.299* (0.141)   0.302*   (0.138) 
Collectivea 0.419** (0.144)   0.427** (0.148)   0.432** (0.141)   0.420** (0.152)   0.434**  (0.150) 
Fiscal Pressure -0.041 (0.030)   -0.021 (0.031)   -0.030 (0.030)   -0.032 (0.031)   -0.016 (0.031) 
Restrictive Labour Contracts 0.004 (0.028)   0.013 (0.028)   0.014 (0.028)   0.011 (0.028)   0.021 (0.028) 
AS -0.078+ (0.044)   -0.076+ (0.044)   -0.078+ (0.044)   -0.081+ (0.044)   -0.079+   (0.044) 
SM 0.007 (0.053)   0.006 (0.053)   0.005 (0.053)   0.011 (0.053)   0.008 (0.053) 
Program Group Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Year Fixed Effects Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Organization Fixed Effects Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Participation       -0.095* (0.042)               -0.049 (0.044) 
Gradual Roll-out             -0.097** (0.031)         -0.072*   (0.031) 
Regular Monitoring                   -0.075** (0.025)   -0.058*   (0.026) 
                          
 
  
Number of Observations 2,524     2,524     2,524     2,524     2,524   
F 7.518     7.213     7.761     7.652     7.284   
Prob>F 0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000   
F (relative to Model 1)       5.19     9.93     9.04     5.89   
Prob>F (relative to Model 1)       0.023     0.002     0.003     0.001   
R-squared 0.091     0.094     0.097     0.099     0.103   
Notes. Standard errors are calculated using robust clustering on organization. Two-tailed tests for variable coefficients. 
†    p<.10, *    p<.05, **  p<.01, ***p<.001.                         
aCategorical variable for the organization's form of government contains separate categories for county-manager, elected, and collective forms of government. 
County-manager is the base category in all regressions. 
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Online Appendix 1 
Factor Analysis of the Outsourcing Process Mechanisms 
Items Participation 
Gradual Roll-
out  
Regular 
Monitoring  
Participation 
Who inside your local government was involved in evaluating the feasibility of private service delivery? 
   Management/budget analysts 0.69 0.23 0.11 
   Finance/accounting officer 0.72 0.10 0.18 
   Attorney 0.75 0.05 0.14 
   Procurement/purchasing officer 0.70 0.20 0.17 
   Line employees 0.68 0.19 0.15 
Who outside your local government organization was involved in evaluating the feasibility of private service 
delivery? 
   Potential service deliverers 0.52 0.09 0.14 
   Professionals/consultants with expertise in service areas 0.64 0.07 0.12 
   Service recipients/consumers 0.60 0.12 0.25 
Gradual Roll-out 
Has your local government undertaken any activities to ensure success in implementing private service 
delivery?  If “yes,” which of the following activities has your government undertaken to ensure success in 
implementing private service delivery? 
   Implementation of private alternatives on a trial basis 0.29 0.67 0.28 
   Applied private alternatives to new services 0.19 0.84 0.21 
   Applied private alternatives to growing services 0.18 0.86 0.24 
Regular Monitoring 
Does your local government use any techniques to systematically evaluate its private service delivery?  If 
“yes,” which of the following aspects of service delivery are evaluated? 
   Citizen satisfaction 0.18 0.06 0.90 
   Cost 0.22 0.26 0.90 
   Compliance with delivery standards specified in contract 0.25 0.24 0.88 
What techniques are used to evaluate the above aspects of service delivery? 
   Monitoring citizen complaints 0.19 0.16 0.90 
   Conducting field observations 0.20 0.26 0.86 
   Analyzing data/records (i.e. demographic/finance data) 0.26 0.17 0.83 
  
   Eigenvalue 1.77 1.80 5.23 
Percentage of Variance Explained 0.23 0.14 0.30 
Cumulative Percentage of Variance Explained 0.23 0.37 0.67 
Cronbach's Alpha 0.67 0.59 0.91 
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Online Appendix 2 
Indices, Components, and Means 
  
Mean 
Participation  
Who inside your local government was involved in evaluating the feasibility of private 
service delivery? 
  
Management and/or budget analysts 0.25 
Finance/accounting officer 0.39 
Attorney 0.24 
Procurement/purchasing officer 0.14 
Line employees 0.12 
Who outside your local government organization was involved in evaluating the 
feasibility of private service delivery? 
  
Potential service deliverers 0.39 
Professionals/consultants with expertise in particular service areas 0.34 
Service recipients/consumers 0.09 
Participation Index 0.24 
  
  
Gradual Roll-out  
Has your local government undertaken any activities to ensure success in implementing 
private service delivery?  If “yes,” which of the following activities has your 
government undertaken to ensure success in implementing private service delivery? 
  
Proposed implementation of private alternatives on a trial basis 0.20 
Applied private alternatives to new services 0.12 
Applied private alternatives to growing services 0.14 
Gradual Roll-out Index 0.14 
    
Regular Monitoring    
Does your local government use any techniques to systematically evaluate its private 
service delivery?  If “yes,” which of the following aspects of service delivery are 
evaluated? 
  
Citizen satisfaction 0.34 
Cost 0.46 
Compliance with delivery standards specified in contract 0.42 
What techniques are used to evaluate the above aspects of service delivery?   
Monitoring citizen complaints 0.37 
Conducting field observations 0.37 
Analyzing data/records (i.e. demographic/finance data) 0.38 
Regular Monitoring Index 0.39 
 
 
